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Abstract. We present an overview of recent research at IDIAP on speech & face based biometric
authentication. This report covers user-customised passwords, adaptation techniques, confidence measures
(for use in fusion of audio & visual scores), face verification in difficult image conditions, as well as
other related research issues. We also overview the Torch machine-learning library, which has aided in the
implementation of the above mentioned techniques.
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1 Introduction
The goal of a biometric identity verification (authentication) system is to either accept or reject the identity
claimed by a given person, based on the person’s characteristics such as speech, face or fingerprints.
Applications range from access control, transaction authentication (e.g. telephone banking), voice mail, secure
teleworking, to forensic work, where the task is to determine whether a biometric sample belongs to a given
suspect [12].
In this paper we present an overview of recent research at IDIAP in the fields of speaker verification (Section
2), face verification (Section 3) and multi-modal verification (Section 4). In Section 5 we describe an open
source machine-learning library, called Torch, which has aided in the implementation of the above mentioned
techniques.
As a thorough introduction to the field of biometrics is beyond the scope of this paper, it is assumed that the
reader is familiar with basic concepts in speaker, face and multi-modal verification. Recent introductory and
review material can be found in [5, 14, 28].
2 Speaker Verification
2.1 Comparison of Several Adaptation Methods
Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs), the main tool used in text-independent speaker verification [25], can
be trained using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm [11]. However, in order to obtain correctly
estimated models, large amount of training data for each client is generally needed, which is usually difficult
to obtain in real applications. Hence several adaptation methods, which start from a general model and adapt
it for specific clients, have been proposed in order to overcome this problem. We recently compared [23] some
of them in order to assess their relative performance on the NIST database [12]. We compared the classical
Bayesian Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) principle [17] with two other techniques, Maximum Likelihood Linear
Regression (MLLR) [16] and eigenvoices [20] (inspired by eigenfaces [31]). Table 1 shows that the simple
MAP technique is still the best adaptation method for GMM-based speaker verification.
One explanation for the poor results of MLLR and EigenVoices might be that both methods force the
parameters of the client models to be in a smaller parameter space, defined by training clients (previously
seen but not used during testing); this may be good for discriminating clients from everything else, but not
necessarily good for discriminating clients from each other.
Method ML MAP MLLR Eigen
HTER1 22.9 15.8 18.42 20.57
Table 1: Performance of adaptation methods on the NIST database.
2.2 Synchronous Alignment
Classical text-dependent speaker verification systems are based on two Hidden Markov Models (HMMs): the
client model θclient and the anti-client model (world model) θworld . The Viterbi algorithm is then used to find
the best path through these models. The main idea of synchronous alignment is to force this path to be the same
for the two models. In [24] we proposed a new Viterbi criterion for such a task:
Q∗ = argmax
Q
p(X,Q|θclient)(1−α) · p(X,Q|θworld)α (1)
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where Q∗ is the best estimated path, X are the observations and α the weight given to the world model.
A similar approach can be used in text-independent speaker verification using GMMs: we force the
Gaussians that maximize the likelihood of the observations to be the same in the two models; initial results
show that this approach is more robust in difficult conditions (poor client data, noisy data) and simplifies the
mathematics.
2.3 Decision Strategies
The statistical framework used in speaker verification usually involves the estimation of the log likelihood ratio
of the access given the client and world models. This ratio is then compared to a threshold which should in
theory be equal to 0, when no other priors are available. In practical applications, this threshold is in fact
estimated on a separate development set in order to reach the Equal Error Rate (EER) or to minimize HTER1.
Instead of searching for such a threshold, we proposed in [2] to estimate a more complex function of the
obtained average log likelihoods given the client and world models. We compared several approaches such as
Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs). On the PolyVar database (over 36,000
tests), the HTER was reduced from 5.55% (using the standard threshold) to 4.73% (using the SVM decision
approach).
2.4 User-Customised Passwords
In a typical text-dependent speaker verification system, the speaker is constrained to a single phrase or a set of
words for which the system has a priori knowledge (e.g. correct phonetic transcription of the phrase, or the
vocabulary from which the phrase can be chosen is very limited [e.g. 10 digits]). Compared to text-independent
systems, where the user can utter any text, text-dependent systems are less user-friendly but generally have
better discrimination ability. In User-Customised Password (UCP) systems [30], the system does not place any
constraints on the password: users are free to choose any text.
Implementation of a UCP system raises several issues; first, we have to infer the HMM topology of
the password; second, we have to create (using adaptation techniques) a speaker dependent model which
models both the lexical content of the password as well as the speaker’s characteristics. Formally, a speaker
pronouncing utterance X is classified as a true claimant Sk associated with password Mk when:
P (Mk, Sk|X) ≥ P (Mk, Sk|X) (2)
and P (Mk, Sk|X) ≥ P (Mk, S|X) (3)
where P (Mk, Sk|X), P (Mk, Sk|X) and P (Mk, S|X), are, respectively, the joint posterior probability of a
true client pronouncing the correct password, an impostor pronouncing the correct password and any speaker
pronouncing any other password.
From the above decision rules we have derived two approaches, described in Sections 2.4.1 & 2.4.2. Both
approaches use the same phonetic inference technique, described as follows: a hybrid HMM/ANN2 system [6]
is used to infer the phonetic transcription for each repetition of the password; based on the best phonetic
transcription (yielding the highest normalised posterior probability), the topology of the HMM password Mk
is selected.
1Half Total Error Rate (HTER) is defined as 1
2
(FA%+FR%), where FA% is the false acceptance rate and FR% is the false rejection
rate.
2ANN = Artificial Neural Network
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2.4.1 HMM based
Using Bayes rule, decision rules (2) and (3) can be rewritten as follows3 [3]:
P (X|Mk, Sk)
P (X|Mk, Sk)
≤ δ1 (4)
and P (X|Mk, Sk)
P (X|Mk, S)
≤ δ2 (5)
The terms on the left side of Eqns. (4) & (5) can be interpreted, respectively, as the speaker verification score
(when the speaker pronounces the correct password) and the utterance verification score. A weighted sum
combination technique is used to estimate the final score [28]. In this approach we adapt (using speaker’s
training data and MAP adaptation) the inferred HMM password Mk, in which each state is a phoneme modeled
by a 3-state HMM model with 3 Gaussians per state. This approach will be referred to as SYS-A.
2.4.2 Combined HMM/ANN and GMM based
Using the conditional probability rule, decision rules (2) and (3) can be rewritten as follows [4]:[
P (Mk|Sk, X)
P (Mk|Sk, X)
] [
P (X|Sk)
P (X|Sk)
]
≥ δ3 (6)
[
P (Mk|Sk, X)
P (Mk|S,X)
] [
P (X|Sk)
P (X|S)
]
≥ δ4 (7)
The first term in both decision rules is the posterior probability that the pronounced word X is Mk; it is
estimated by an ANN. The second term is the verification score found using a text-independent GMM-based
system. A weighted sum combination technique is used to combine the two scores. For each speaker we adapt
a single-layer perceptron and a GMM. We shall refer to this approach as SYS-B.
2.4.3 Evaluation
Results on the PolyVar Database [9], using both inferred and correct phonetic transcriptions, are shown in
Table 2. We can see that SYS-A is somewhat sensitive to the accuracy of the transcription process. For SYS-B
we have found that the performance is close to using the GMM sub-system alone, indicating that when a GMM
model is trained using only short words, it becomes speaker- as well as speech-dependent.
SYS-A (I) SYS-A (C) SYS-B (I) SYS-B (C)
α 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5
EER 3.35% 3.03% 3.51% 3.45%
Table 2: Performance with optimal combination parameter α. (C) and (I) denote systems using the correct and
the inferred phonetic transcription, respectively.
2.5 Future Work
In text-independent systems, verification approaches directly based on discriminative techniques such as MLPs
and SVMs currently fail to match the verification performance of the (generative) GMM approach. Why is
it so? One of the reasons could be the criterion used during training: MLPs and SVMs try to minimize the
total classification error instead of the HTER or EER. Initial results for MLPs and SVMs trained using a more
appropriate criterion are promising.
3Assuming that the a priori simultaneous probability of any speaker and any word is equal for all combinations of speakers and words
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3 Face Verification
Generally speaking, a full face verification system can be thought of as being comprised of three stages:
1. Face localisation and segmentation
2. Normalisation
3. The actual face verification, which can be further subdivided into:
(a) Feature extraction
(b) Classification
The second stage (normalisation) usually involves a geometric transformation (to correct for size and rotation),
but it can also involve an illumination normalisation (however, illumination normalisation may not be necessary
if the feature extraction method is robust against varying illumination). Here we concentrate on stage (3).
3.1 Enhanced PCA Feature Extraction
A major source of errors is the sensitivity of the feature extraction stage to illumination direction changes.
While this sensitivity is a large concern in security systems, in forensic applications [21] other types of
image corruption can be important; here, face images may be obtained in various illumination conditions from
various sources: digitally stored video, possibly damaged and/or low quality analogue video tape or TV signal
corrupted with “static” noise (see Fig. 1 for example images).
In standard Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based feature extraction (also known as eigenfaces [31]),
a given face image is represented by matrix F containing grey level pixel values; F is converted to a face
vector, ~f , by concatenating all the columns; a D-dimensional feature vector, ~x, is then obtained by:
~x = UT (~f − ~fµ) (8)
where U contains D eigenvectors (with largest corresponding eigenvalues) of the training data covariance
matrix, and ~fµ is the mean of training face vectors.
PCA derived features have been shown to be sensitive to changes in the illumination direction causing rapid
degradation in verification performance [29]. In the proposed enhanced PCA approach4, a given face image
is processed using recently proposed DCT-mod2 feature extraction [29] to produce pseudo-image Fˆ , which is
then used in place of F by traditional PCA feature extraction. Since DCT-mod2 feature vectors are robust to
illumination changes, features obtained via the enhanced PCA should also be robust to illumination changes.
Formally, the pseudo image is constructed as follows:
Fˆ =

~c (∆b,∆a) ~c (∆b,2∆a) ~c (∆b,3∆a) · · ·
~c (2∆b,∆a) ~c (2∆b,2∆a) ~c (2∆b,3∆a) · · ·
~c (3∆b,∆a) ~c (3∆b,2∆a) ~c (3∆b,3∆a) · · ·
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 (9)
where ~c (n∆b,n∆a) denotes the DCT-mod2 feature vector for an 8×8 block located at (n∆b, n∆a), while ∆b
and ∆a are block location advancement constants for rows and columns respectively (here, ∆b=∆a=4).
Experiments [27] on the VidTIMIT database show (see Table 3) that the enhanced PCA technique retains
all the positive aspects of traditional PCA (that is robustness against white noise and compression artefacts)
while also being robust to illumination direction changes; moreover enhanced PCA outperforms histogram
equalisation pre-processing.
4The enhanced PCA technique was initially developed by Conrad Sanderson at Griffith University [26], under the supervision of
Professor Kulip K. Paliwal; here we present the results in a new experimental setup and more image conditions.
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Figure 1: Left to right: original image, corrupted with linear illumination change, Gaussian illumination
change, white Gaussian noise, compression artefacts.
Type clean lin. illum. Gaus. illum. white noise compr.
standard 3.57 27.14 32.19 3.57 3.57
hist. equ. 4.29 32.86 36.34 7.14 4.33
enhanced 5.31 7.14 18.57 5.67 6.03
Table 3: EER Performance of PCA based feature extraction
3.2 Comparison between GMM and MLP classifiers
The choice of the classifier not only has an impact on the discrimination ability of the system, but also
its robustness to imperfectly located faces. Experiments on the XM2VTS database show that (when using
DCT-mod2 features [29]) the GMM approach easily outperforms the MLP approach for high resolution faces
and is significantly more robust to imperfectly located faces (see Table 4). Further experiments [8] have shown
that the computational requirements of the GMM approach can be significantly smaller than the MLP approach
at a cost of small loss of performance.
Model type (face size) FA% FR% HTER
GMM (80×64) 1.95 2.75 2.35
MLP (80×64) 11.55 11.25 11.40
GMM (40×32) 5.47 6.25 5.86
MLP (40×32) 7.98 9.75 8.86
Table 4: Comparison of GMM and MLP performance using automatically located faces (XM2VTS, Config. I)
4 Confidence Measures for Fusion
Several recent contributions have shown that combining the decisions or scores coming from various unimodal
verification systems (based, for instance, on the voice or the face of a person) often enhances the overall
authentication performance (e.g. [19, 28]). This has been shown to be true using various fusion algorithms,
from the simplest ones such as product or sum rules, to the more complex ones such as SVMs or MLPs.
Various researchers and practitioners have expressed an interest in the estimation of some sort of confidence
on decisions taken by authentication systems. Based on this interest, we recently analysed several methods
to improve fusion algorithms by trying to estimate complementary information such as a confidence on the
decision of each unimodal system [1]. One can think of the fusion algorithms as a way to somehow weight
the scores of different unimodal verification systems, eventually in a nonlinear way, in order to give a better
estimation of the overall score. If one had access not only to the scores but also to a confidence measure
on these scores, this measure could help in the fusion process. Hence, intuitively, if for some reason one
unimodal verification system was able to say that its score for a given access was not very precise, while a
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second unimodal verification system was more confident on its own score, the fusion algorithm should be able
to provide a better decision than without this knowledge.
The methods proposed in [1] where rather simple. The first one was based on the hypothesis that scores
coming from unimodal verification systems could have been generated by two Gaussian distributions, one
for the genuine accesses and one for the impostor accesses. Based on this hypothesis, a simple confidence
score can be derived. Since this Gaussian hypothesis is false in general, the second proposed method was
based instead on a simple non-parametric idea: estimate the confidence associated with a score using a simple
histogram. Finally, the third proposed method was based on the possibility of estimating the gradient of a
simple confidence measure (such as the likelihood) that could be extracted from the model, with respect to all
its parameters. The amplitude of such gradient would then give an idea of the adequacy of the model to explain
the decision (a small value would mean that the model is confident, while a large value would imply a small
confidence on the decision).
In experiments on the XM2VTS database [22], the above methods were used to compute additional inputs
given to the fusion algorithm. Results are presented in Table 5. The traditional fusion algorithm (SVM in this
case) was trained with two inputs: the log likelihood of the score given the client model and the log likelihood
of the score given the world model. The “fusion + confidence” model was also an SVM, trained with four
inputs: the two log likelihoods plus the two corresponding model adequacy estimates of the confidence of each
model. While it is clear that the fusion algorithm clearly enhances the performance, adding some confidence
information adds a modest relative improvement of 6% on the overall performance.
A probably more interesting way of using confidence values for authentication systems is to propose to
delay (or hand over to a human) a decision when the associated confidence is lower than a given threshold.
Using the non-parametric method of computing the confidence values, and selecting for instance the threshold
in such a way that less than 0.64% of accesses were set aside, it was possible to reduce the overall HTER
obtained on configuration I of XM2VTS from 0.69% to 0.45%, a 35% relative performance improvement.
HTERSystem Config. I Config. II
Face only (with MLPs) 3.22 2.61
Voice only (with GMMs) 1.91 1.75
Fusion using SVMs 0.69 0.30
Fusion + Confidence 0.67 0.26
Table 5: Verification performance on XM2VTS
5 The Open-Source Torch library
The open source C++ Torch library5 implements most state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms in a unified
framework. The objective is to ease the comparison between algorithms, simplify the process of extending
them and provide a platform for easy implementation of new algorithms. Unlike programs such as Matlab
which are more suited for prototyping and toy problems, C++ programs written with the aid of Torch are able
to deal with large real-life problems.
Torch can handle both static and dynamic problems. For example, Torch can deal with all kinds of
“gradient-machines” which can be trained with the back-propagation algorithm [13]. Many modules are
available, which can be connected with each other in order to obtain the desired machine. Creating a
5Torch is available under a BSD license from www.torch.ch
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multi-layered perceptron, a mixture of experts, a radial basis function neural network, or even a time delay
neural network or a complex convolutional neural network (spatial or temporal), takes only a few lines of C++
code with the aid of Torch.
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [13, 32] are available in Torch; in fact, their implementation is one of the
fastest available [18, 10]. Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs), often used to represent any static distribution,
have also been implemented in Torch.
The Hidden Markov Model (HMM) approach [13] is one of the most widely used techniques to represent
sequences (such as biological sequences, speech data, or handwritten data). In Torch the user has the possibility
to create HMMs with many kinds of distribution models, including methods based on artificial neural networks.
It is also possible to train them either with an Expectation Maximization algorithm [11], with a Viterbi [33]
algorithm, or even using gradient ascent. Moreover, several classes have also been implemented in order to
be able to solve connected word speech recognition tasks. Small and large vocabulary decoders, compatible
with Torch, are available. We have also implemented the Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) [17, 25] adaptation
technique for both GMMs and HMMs.
Simple algorithms such as k-means, k-nearest neighbours or Parzen windows are provided as well.
Bagging [7] and boosting [15] which are both “ensemble” algorithms, can be applied in Torch to almost any
machine learning algorithm.
Being able to use all these algorithms in a simple yet unified framework enables researchers to compare
them and easily enhance them. We strongly believe that providing such a platform to the community helps
researchers to propose, develop and share novel algorithms more quickly.
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